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facto and ward probably ceases upon majority and a mere agency relation
exists, 13 although some courts have held that it continues. 1 4
The two Indiana cases upon which the decision in the principal case is
based15 establish that-an infant may consider any person entering upon his
land and receiving proceeds thereof as his "guardian, bailiff or trustee" and
compel him to account for them in a court of equity. Consistency with decisions of other jurisdictions, with logic and justice necessarily requires that
the same rule apply to personal property of the ward (treated in the same
way.)1 6 Further support is given the decision in the principal case by another Indiana decision which holds that since a ward is incapable of choosing a theory or representative, of waiving a right or doing any act that
would operate as an estoppel, his guardian likewise can do none of these
things for him, to his detriment. The failure of The East Chicago State Bank,
in whose position the receiver now stands, which acted and was recognized
by the court as guardian, can thus not amount to an estoppel to defeat the
present guardian's claim.
The decision appears sound as an application of the de facto guardian
principle, a rule of justice and fairness, to the policy of the controlling statute.1S
W. A. V.

TORTS--DuTY OWED BY RAILROAD TO HABITUAL TRESPASSERs.-In a suit
against the engineer of a train, the railroad company, and its receiver,
appellant sought damages for personal injuries received when, through the
alleged negligent operation of the train, appellant, a boy of twelve, riding
between two cars, lost his balance, and caught his foot in the coupling.
Appellant had climbed on the train during switching operations, when it
stopped on a track which lay within one-hundred feet of a public playground. Evidence was introduced that children long had been accustomed
to leave the playground and ride on trains switching on the nearby tracks
without serious objection from railroad employees, but with their knowledge.
It was shown that those in charge of the train had not seen the boy get on,
and that they could not have seen him after he had taken his position between
the cars. The parties stipulated that appellant was a trespasser. Held:
affirmed for defendants. Assuming that appellees were burdened with constructive knowledge of the appellant's presence on the train, appellees owed
13 Martin's Admr. v. Fielder (1887), 82 Va. 455, 4 S. E. 602.
14 Parmentier v. Phillips (1816), 4 N. C. (2 Car. Law Reps.) 294; Chaney
v. Smallwood (1843), 1 Gill (Md.) 367.
15 Grimes et. al. v. Wilson et. ux., (1837), 4 Blackf. 332; Breeding v.
Shinn (1856), 8 Ind. 125.
1
GVan Epps v. Van Deusen (1833), 4 Paige (N. Y.) 64, 25 Am. Dec.
516, (money and profits of services of a slave) ; Chancy v. Smallwood (1843),
1 Gill (Md.) 367, (profits from services of slaves).
17 McCord v. Bright (1909), 44 Ind. App. 275.
18 Note, however, that the statute involved in this case was amended
as part of the Financial Institutions Act of 1933. The present applicable
provision precludes the result of the instant case by providing for the conveyance to a new trustee or guardian of property held by the bank in any
fiduciary capacity under the appointment of any court. Burns' Ind. Stat.
(1933), § 18-321.
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him no duty except to refrain from willfully injuring him after they became
burdened with such constructive knowledge. Dickerson v. E-win (Ind. 1938),
17 N. E. (2d) 496.
By "constructive knowledge" the court can mean only that the facts disclosed reason to know of the presence of trespassers, or reason to expect
2
However, it
them. 1 Whether or not such facts existed is a jury matter.
is submitted the court is in error as to the duty owed by a property owner,
in this case the railroad, to those persons we may call "habitual" or "con3
stant" trespassers.
The court purports to distinguish the case on its facts from Cleveland etc.
4
R. Co. v. Means (largely on the grounds that the child injured in that case
was very young-in the words of the court, non sui juris), and overlooks
the real basis upon which the child was there permitted recovery, i.e., that
the probable presence of children upon property where a dangerous activity
is being carried on, imposes a duty of ordinary care upon the owner of
5
such property to anticipate their presence by keeping a look-out for them.
A few courts have said that persons engaging in dangerous activities upon
their property ordinarily owe no duty to trespassing persons, whether children
or adults, other than to refrain from "willfully and wantonly" injuring them;e
nevertheless, when reasonable grounds for anticipating or expecting trespassers
exists, particularly if no effort has been made to warn the trespassers or
7
prevent the trespassing, whether the issue is one of condition of the
1It is not contended that this is a correct definition of "constructive
knowledge." But that the court's meaning is as indicated, is clearly shown
in the case of Cleveland etc. R. Co. v. Means (1915), 59 Ind. App. 383, 108
N. E. 375, from which the phrase is taken, as well as in the present case.
2 Counizzari v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. (1915), 248 Pa. 474, 94 A. 1$4.
That the determination of such facts is for the jury seems patent, and no
extensive documentation of authority is attempted.
3Trespassers whose presence is to be anticipated, i.e., expectable or
probable, may be designated by these terms. Although perhaps not extensively employed they are particularly useful in distinguishing this type of
intruder upon property from the "known" or."discovered" trespasser.
4 (1915), 59 Ind. App. 383, 108 N. E. 375.
5 See also; Counizzari v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. (1915), 248 Pa. 474,
94- A. 134; Ollis v. Houston, E. W. & T. Ry. Co. (1903), 31 Tex. Civ. App.
601, 73 S. W. 30; Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Watkins (1895), 29 S. W. 232. The
Texas cases are exceptional in that they impose upon the railroad a duty to
keep a look-out for all trespassers upon their property and require a very
high degree of care where trespassers are known to be expectable. The duty
owed to children may go considerably beyond the mere keeping of a look-out.
See; Devereaux v. Thornton (1879), 4 Ohio Dec. Rep. 449; Harris v. Indiana General Service Co. (1934), 206 Ind. 351, 189 N. E. 410; Excelsior
Wire Rope Co. Ltd. v. Callan (1930), A. C. 404; also 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 370.
6 Salt River Valley Water Users Assn. v. Compton (1932), 39 Ariz.
491, 8 P. (2d) 249; Hamakawa v. Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co. (1935),
4 Cal. (2d) 499, 50 P. (2d) 803; Makimshuk v. Union Collieries Co. (1937),
128 Pa. Super. 86, 193 A. 669; Cleveland & Means (1915), 59 Ind. App.
383, 108 N. E. 575. See also: Green, Basis of Responsibility in Tort (1922-23),
21 Mich. L. Rev. 495.
7The effect of warning is too large a subject matter to analyze in this
note. The problem of warning arises as one of the elements that may be
involved in a duty of reasonable care, once that duty has been found to exist.
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8
premises or of activities upon the land, a duty of reasonable care arises.
The duty to maintain a look-out for habitually trespassing children is strongly
analogous to the duty imposed under the so-called "attractive nuisance" doctrine, where the expectability of the presence of children in certain places
gives rise to a duty in the property owner to exercise due car for thir safety
9
Railroad cars, of course, are
with respect to artificial conditions on his land.
10
the analogy being useful
not ordinarily considered "attractive nuisances",
only in emphasizing the fact that the "expectability" of trespassing children
raises a duty of reasonable care.

The duty owed to known or discovered trespassers, whether children or
11
This duty extends to those
adults, is well settled as one of ordinary care.
trespassers whose presence, though not actually known, is expectable.12
Habitual trespass has been recognized as imposing a duty of ordinary care
in Indiana,1 8 as well as in other jurisdictions.1 4 Although the actual result
8Wolfe v. Rehbein (1937), 123 Conn. 110, 193 A. 608; Harris v. Indiana
General Service Co. (1934), 206 Ind. 351, 189 N. E. 410; Fort Wayne &
Northern Indiana Traction Co. v. Stark (1920), 74 Ind. App. 669, 127 N.
E. 460; Cleveland etc. R. Co. v. Means (1915), 59 Ind. App. 383, 108 N. E.
375; Hogan v. Etna Concrete Block Co. (1936), 325 Pa. 49, 188 A. 763;
Ollis v. Houston, E. W. & T. Ry. Co. (1903), 31 Tex. Civ. App. 601, 73
S. W. 30; Christiansen v. Los Angeles & S. L R Co (1930), 77 Utah 85, 291
P. 926, noted in 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 370; Excelsior Wire Rope Co. Ltd. v.
Callan (1930), A. C. 404. See also: Harper, A Treatise on the Law of
Torts; Green, Basis of Responsibility in Tort (1923), 21 Mich. L. Rev. 495;
Bohlen, Duty of a Landowner Towards Those Entering His Premises of
Their Own Right (1920), 69 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 142, 237, 340, at p. 251;
Restatement, Torts, §§ 334, 338.
9 Barrett v. Southern Pac. Co. (1891), 91 Cal. 296, 27 P. 666, 25 Am.
St. 186; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Fox (1906), 38 Ind App. 268, 70 N. E. 81;
Christiansen v. Los Angeles & S. L. Ry. Co. (1930), 77 Utah 85, 291 p. 926;
Restatement, Torts, § 339; 36 A. L. R. 34, 39 A. L. R. 486, 45 A. L. R. 982,
53 A. L. R. 1344, 60 A. L. R. 1444.
10 Cleveland etc. R. Co. v. Means (1915), 59 Ind. App. 383, 108 N. E.
375 (the court discussed the "attractive nuisance" doctrine, but did not place
the cars within its scope); Smith v. Hines (1925), 212 Ky. 30, 278 S. W.
142; Christiansen v. Los Angeles (1930), 77 Utah 85, 291 p. 926; 36 A. L. R.
217.
11 Leach v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. (1931), 48 F. (2d) 722;
Hamakawa v. Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co. (1935), 4 Cal. (2d) 499,
50 P. (2d) 803. See dicta in: Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co.
(1932), 85 N. H. 499, 163 A. 111; Osalek v. Baltimore & 0. Ry. Co. (1929),
295 Pa. 553, 145 A. 582, 72 A. L. R. .526; Green, Basis of Responsibility
in Tort (1923), 21 Mich. L. Rev. 495.
12 Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co. (1932), 85 N. H. 499, 163
A. 111; and note language in Restatement, Torts, §§ 336, 338.
13 The Indiana cases are: Harris v. Indiana General Service Co. (1934),
206 Ind. 351, 189 N. E. 410; Fort Wayne & Northern Indiana Traction Co.
v. Stark (1920), 74 Ind. App. 669, 127 N. E. 460 (a particularly strong case
in that it denies that the only basis for holding a property owner who maintains dangerous conditions on his premises to a duty of care is that of the
'attractive nuisance" doctrine, and holds that reasonable care must be exercised
whenever the presence of children reasonably may be anticipated); Cleveland
etc. Ry. Co. v. Means (1915), 59 Ind. App. 383, 108 N. B. 375.
14 The foundation of this principle is the famous English case of Lowery
v. Walker (1911) A. C. 10. The cases following this precedent, in jurisdictions other than Indiana may be found in footnote 8, supra.
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in the present case, even when judged by a standard of reasonable care, is
15
it is submitted that the liability formula of the court is
probably correct,
unfortunate, and not in accordance with authority. The only conceivable
basis upon which the liability formula of the court can be justified, is to
make the failure of the railroad to take account of the habitual trespassers
6
strong evidence of willful and wanton misconduct,1 and this the court showed
C. B. D.
no inclination to do.

TORTS-PROXIMATE CAUSE-INTERVENING CAUSE.-In violation of a city
ordinance a construction company obstructed the street and sidewalk in front
of property upon which it was building a garage. While plantiff's intestate
.was walking into the street to get around the obstruction, she was struck
by an automobile. Plaintiff, as administratrix, sues the city, the construction
company, and the property owner alleging negligence in allowing the obstructing of the public way. Held: The negligence of the defendants was not the
proximate cause of the injury. City of Gary et al v. Struble (Ind. App.
1939), 18 N. E. (2d) 465.
Negligence is the creation of an unreasonable risk toward a particular
class of persons in respect to certain types of harm.1 Such a tortious act
may bring many harmful consequences, but the law as a matter of policy
holds the actor accountable for only a few; the rest of the harms, being too
remote, are said not to be the proximate result of the act. In drawing the line
between proximate and remote consequences, one must scrutinize not only the
consequences themselves, but also the character of the conduct to determine
toward whom the defendant is negligent. There is a clash of opinion as to
whether attention should be focused primarily on the extent of the risk created
or on the nature of the resulting harms, but it is to be noted that the difference
2
is only one of analysis.

15 The appellant admitted making sure that he was unobserved before
mounting the cars. The train was moved only at a slow rate of speed, and
it is difficult to see how merely bringing the train to a halt could amount
to negligent operation, or failure to exercise due care. To impose a duty
of giving warning before stopping the train under such circumstances would
seem clearly unreasonable.
16The results obtained by such a rule would be more harsh than under
a standard of reasonable care. At least one Indiana case has apparently
reached its result in this manner. The facts are not analagous to the present
case, and the court was dealing with what might have been an "attractive
nuisance" situation. Penso v. McCormick (1890), 125 Ind. 116, 25 N. E.
156, 9 L. R. A. 313, 21 Am. St. 211.
1 Restatement, Torts (1934), §§ 281-2.
2Those emphasizing the character of the conduct to see the scope of the
risk created leave only the question of cause in fact to be determined by
looking to the consequences. Advocates of this view include Leon Green,
Rationale of Proximate Cause, (1927) ; and Cardozo, J. in Palsgraf v. Long
Island R. Co. (1928), 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99.
Proponents of the consequences test look to the conduct only to see if
there is any unreasonable risk created toward anyone without regard to the
class of persons or type of harm. This "negligence in the air" view was
advocated by Andrews, J. dissenting in Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co.
(1928), 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99. Ths test throws more of a load on the

